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Balkanization of Interstate Energy
Markets: New Variations of
Sovereign Self-Interest
James M. Friedman*
Michael L. Hardy**
Timothy F. Wuliger***
The current "energy crisis" hasprompted many states to invoke measures which
restrict interstate consumption of their energy resources in order to preserve orprofit
from such materials. Other states, feeling the pinch between energy needs and envi-
ronmentalregulations, have also sought to restrict interstate consumption in order to
promote in-state use. Federal legislation has been enacted to achieve the latter ob-
jective. This article examines the validity of these attempts in light of the commerce
clause and concludes that, by resort to the policies embodied in that constitutional
provision and to a realistic approach regarding the effects of these mechanisms, the
state actions willfall notwithstanding their motivation.
INTRODUCTION
CTREATER COMPETITION among consumers-be they gov-
emmental, industrial, commercial, or residential-for increas-
ingly scarce energy resources, together with environmental laws
designed to promote clean utilization of energy, have given rise in
the United States to attempts at economic balkanization-an out-
break of sophisticated protectionist legislation in, and on behalf
of, states with significant energy resources.' Such legislation gen-
erally is aimed at preserving a state's energy resources for its citi-
zens, or at profiting from a state's natural abundance of energy
supplies.2
At the state level, these objectives have been sought through
various taxation schemes,3 arniong other devices.' Not surpris-
* A.B. (1963), Dartmouth College; LL.B. (1966), Harvard University. Mr. Fried-
man is a partner in the firm of Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen in Cleveland, Ohio.
** A.B. (1969), John Carroll University; J.D. (1972), University of Michigan. Mr.
Hardy is a partner in the firm of Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen in Cleveland, Ohio.
*** B.A. (1973), Emory University; J.D. (1976), Georgetown University. Mr. Wuliger
is associated with the firm of Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen in Cleveland, Ohio.
1. See notes 25-224 infra and accompanying text.
2. Id.
3. See notes 34-170 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 25-33 infra and accompanying text.
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ingly, these actions have been challenged as violations of the com-
merce clause.5 Currently, two controversies have arisen regarding
the validity of a state tax on an energy resource-a resource that
will ultimately be placed in interstate commerce. In one, several
states have attacked Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas6 as
unconstitutional.7 In the other, Montana's Coal Severance Tax8 is
being constitutionally challenged by a number of utilities and coal
companies.' Notably, both these cases raise interesting issues re-
garding the scope of commerce clause protections as well as the
validity of judicially developed guidelines in light of the current
political and economic realities in the area of energy resources.
Ohio has also sought to protect its natural energy resources.
However, Ohio's goals are different from most other states.
Rather than seeking to protect its resources against out-of-state
use, Ohio-because its coal has high sulfur content which renders
the coal's use environmentally unsound without expensive anti-
pollution facilities'-has sought to encourage in-state users to
burn Ohio coal exclusively." To further this goal' 2 state legisla-
tion was enacted. 3 This was successfully challenged on constitu-
tional grounds. 4 Yet, Ohio's problems remain noteworthy not
only because of its contrast with other forms of energy balkaniza-
tion, but also because of the existence of federal legislation appar-
ently designed to assist that state's objectives. 5
This article first will discuss the validity of attempts to protect
state energy resources, particularly in light of the commerce
clause. After examining the historical context provided by deci-
sions which have confronted previous protectionist attempts and
which have promoted the commerce clause as a great obstacle to
the validity of such attempts,' 6 this article focuses on the recent
5. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
6. LA REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-07 (West Supp. 1978).
7. Maryland v. Louisiana, Orig. Action No. 83 (U.S. S. Ct., filed March 29, 1979).
See notes 66-109 infra and accompanying text.
8. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to 15-35-110 (Supp. 1977).
9. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist., filed
June 20, 1978). See notes 110-70 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 171 infra.
11. See notes 171-92 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 171-74 infra and accompanying text.
13. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5751.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1976).
14. Mapco., Inc. v. Grunder, 12 ENVIR. REP. CASE (BNA) 2025 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
15. Clean Air Act § 125, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7425 (West Supp. 1978). See notes 195-235
infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 25-65 infra and accompanying text. But see Marston & Moring, Federal
Restraints on Interstate Natural Gas Supply and Market Expansion, 54 N. D. L. REV. 374
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controversies in Louisiana 7 and Montana.' 8 This discussion
demonstrates that states may be able to enact balkanizing meas-
ures if the scope of the commerce clause may be avoided. 19 Such
an approach may be of limited utility and may be discarded when
economic realities and case law are considered.20
The focus then shifts to Ohio and consideration is given to the
question of whether a state may erect barriers for the purpose of
promoting exclusive in-state use of a state's resources. 21 After
concluding that the commerce clause would make no distinction
regarding motivation,22 the article examines the validity of an at-
tempt by Congress to accomplish similar goals.23 Again referring
to economic and political realities, the analysis concludes that this
congressional attempt may indeed be questioned.24
I. HiSTORICAL CONTEXT
The commerce clause has figured prominently in the past as a
factor limiting the attempts by states to hoard or take special ad-
vantage of their native energy resources. A brief review of some
past legal confrontations over energy supplies will demonstrate
how the courts have applied the commerce clause and other legal
principles to the problem and may illustrate some potential reso-
lutions to current disputes.
Early in the twentieth century Oklahoma sought to hoard its
supplies of natural gas by statutorily prohibiting the transporta-
tion of gas produced in Oklahoma to points outside the state.25
This unsophisticated power play was struck down by the Supreme
Court in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.26 as incompatible with
the commerce clause. The Court noted that if the Oklahoma stat-
ute were to be upheld as a conservation measure enacted to pro-
mote state welfare, then "embargo may be retaliated by embargo;
and commerce will be halted at State lines."'27 The Court found
(1978) where the authors discuss how federal regulatory policies have impeded develop-
ment and interstate consumption of domestic natural gas supplies.
17. See notes 66-109 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 110-51 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 151-70 infra.
20. See id.
21. See notes 171-92 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 181-92 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 193-235 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 226-35 infra and accompanying text.
25. See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 239 n.1 (1911).
26. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
27. Id. at 255.
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that such a result, however, was contrary to the goal of the com-
merce clause, which was designed so that where "each State is
made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and cre-
ated, with every other State, and those of every other State with
it." 28
A similar obstruction of interstate commerce was repudiated
by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.29 In that
case, Ohio and Pennsylvania brought original actions challenging
a West Virginia statutory scheme30 that assured all West Virginia
consumers that their natural gas requirements would be met
before any of the state's natural gas could be shipped elsewhere.
The Court had little trouble rejecting West Virginia's argument
that the statute was an acceptable means of assuring that a quasi-
public business (Le., a utility) would furnish adequate service
within reasonable territorial limits by noting that the business at
issue went beyond the state's borders.31 Relying on West v. Kan-
sas Natural Gas Co., 32 the Court also dismissed the argument that
West Virginia had too little natural gas to satisfy its own needs as
well as the needs of consumers in neighboring states. 33
Not surprisingly, states have also resorted to taxation as a way
of profiting from, if not indirectly restricting, interstate commerce
in energy supplies. In Michigan- Wisconsin P#ieline Co. v. Cal-
vert,34 two natural gas companies challenged a Texas tax on
"gathering gas"-e., a tax based on the amount of gas "taken"
into the companies' transmission lines from the pipeline of the gas
producer.35 The Court concluded that the tax was not on the lo-
cal, physical collection of gas, but on the introduction of gas into
interstate commerce.36 In addition, the Court reasoned that if the
Texas tax were upheld, multiple tax burdens on the same gas
28. Id.
29. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
30. 1919 W. VA. AcTs, ch. 71 (1919) quoted in, 262 U.S. at 582 n.l.
31. 262 U.S. at 597.
32. 221 U.S. 229, 251 (1919). See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
33. Id. at 598.
34. 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
35. 1951 TEx. GEN. LAWS, ch. 402, § XXIII. This statute provided:
In the case of gas containing gasoline or liquid hydrocarbons that are removed or
extracted at a plant within the State by scrubbing, absorption, compression or any
other process, the term 'gathering gas' means the first taking or the first retaining
of possession of such gas for other processing or transmission ... after such gas
has passed through the outlet of such plant.
Id. See 347 U.S. at 161.
36. 347 U.S. at 169-70.
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might occur as other states imposed similar taxes.37 Accordingly,
the Court struck down the tax as a prohibited interference with
interstate commerce.38
The commerce clause has more recently been found to pose a
formidable limitation on the power of states to exercise control
over interstate use of in-state energy resources. In Federal Power
Commission v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 9 the Federal
Power Commission sued to enjoin the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (OCC) from enforcing orders which prohibited natu-
ral gas sales below stated minimum prices.' The OCC defended
its orders arguing that "if the Orders accomplish their intended
purpose, more gas will be available for consumption to all con-
sumers including interstate consumers."'" The district court, how-
ever, held that the orders burdened interstate commerce "by
indirectly fixing prices to interstate consumers."42 The Court fur-
ther found that the orders were a burden on interstate commerce
because they conflicted with rates fixed by the Federal Power
Commission pursuant to its authority under the Natural Gas
Act,43 and threatened "'to withdraw a large volume of gas from
an established interstate current'" in violation of the commerce
clause.44
State efforts to affect the flow of energy resources through in-
terstate commerce by protecting in-state reserves have also been
invalidated on other than constitutional grounds. For example, in
A.rizona Public Service Co. v. Snead,45 the Supreme Court avoided
constitutional arguments' that attacked a New Mexico statute
which taxed the generation of electricity by a utility, but allowed
that tax to be credited in full against the utility's separate gross
37. Id. at 170. Cf. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734, 749 n.18 (1978).
38. Id.
39. 362 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
40. Id. at 525-27.
41. Id. at 527.
42. Id. at 533.
43. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
44. 362 F. Supp. at 535.
45. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
46. Several states which participated as amii curiae on the side of the plaintiff-utilities
had argued, for example, that a New Mexico Act, see note 41 infra, violated the commerce
clause by subjecting exported electrical energy to double taxation, and by burdening inter-
state commerce. They further contended that the Act was actually an extraterritorial tax
and therefore violated the due process clause. Amicus Brief for Appellant, Arizona Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
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receipts tax liability to New Mexico.47 To the extent that a public
utility did not sell electricity generated in New Mexico to retail
consumers within New Mexico, no gross receipts tax existed
against which the tax imposed by the Act could be offset. The
Court found the New Mexico scheme to be discriminatory state
taxation on generation or transmission of electricity, and held it
invalid under section 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.48
Addressing the only constitutional issue in its opinion, the Court
relied on Wickard v. Filburn49 and Katzenbach v. McCung5  to
dismiss New Mexico's contention that if section 2121(a) invali-
dated the Act, then that section exceeded congressional authority
under the commerce clause.5'
47. The act in question in Arizona imposed a tax of .4 mills on each kilowatt hour of
electricity generated by a public utility, N. M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18-3 (1978), but allowed a
full credit of the tax against a public utility's separate gross receipts tax liability to New
Mexico. Id. at § 7-9-80. To the extent that a public utility did not sell electricity generated
in New Mexico to retail consumers within New Mexico, no gross receipts tax existed
against which the tax imposed by the Act could be offset. 441 U.S. at 145.
48. Id. at 149-50. See 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976), which provides:
No State, or political subdivision thereof, may impose or assess a tax on or with
respect to the generation or transmission of electricity which discriminates against
out-of-state manufacturers, producers, wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of that
electricity. For purposes of this section, a tax is discriminatory if it results, either
directly or indirectly, in a greater tax burden on electricity which is generated and
transmitted in interstate commerce than on electricity which is generated and
transmitted in intrastate commerce.
49. 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
50. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
51. 441 U.S. at 150. This dismissal was premised on the existence of the plenary com-
merce power given Congress under the commerce clause. See notes 193-235 infra and
accompanying text.
Challenges to gross receipts taxes upon electric utilities are pending in Pennsylvania
and West Virginia, both in early phases of litigation. The taxes in these cases are similar to
the one struck down in Arizona; thus both face strong challenges on constitutional grounds
as well as with regard to consistency with § 2121(a). In Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Lopus, Case No. 643 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed March 31, 1978), twelve electric utilities have
brought an action to have a Pennsylvania tax, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 8101(b)(2) (Purdon
Supp. 1978), declared unconstitutional to the extent that it imposes a tax on gross receipts
of electric utilities from sales of electricity generated within Pennsylvania to out-of-state
consumers. The utilities rely in part on the commerce clause and on § 2121(a) of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 391, (repealed 1976). The case may never be decided
because a bill to repeal the tax is pending in Pennsylvania's legislature. H.B. 852 (1979),
subsequently enacted as Act 107 (1979), repealed the tax prospectively, effective as of Janu-
ary 1, 1980. S.B. 1322 (1980) would accomplish retroactive repeal by changing the effective
date of Act 107 to January 1, 1977.
In Duquesne Light Co. v. State Tax Dep't, Civ. Action No. CA-78 1789 (Kanawha Cir.
Ct., filed May 29, 1978), seven electric utilities are contesting West Virginia's tax on genera-
tion of electricity. 4 W. VA. CODE §§ 11-13-2d, 11-13-2m (Supp. 1979). Effective April I,
1978, West Virginia reduced its tax on retail sales of electricity from 5.72 percent (for do-
mestic and commercial purposes) and 4.29 percent (for all other purposes) to four percent,
[Vol. 30:291
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In summary, the commerce clause has posed a formidable bar-
rier against attempts by states to restrict interstate use of energy
resources. These attempts have been invalidated either because
they were inconsistent with the policies of the clause 52 or because
they were inconsistent with statutes designed to promote these
policies.5 3
Yet, states seeking to preserve or profit from their resources
may still have options open to them to pursue such goals. First, a
state might be able to design its tax to impose a levy on a purely
local activity. If this were done, states might be within their con-
stitutional authority, independent of any commerce clause limita-
tions.54 Second, a question arises as to whether the need to protect
interstate commerce-and enhance the national economy-might
in some circumstances be outweighed by legitimate local interests
(which excludes any local interest aimed at deriving pecuniary
gain by direct obstruction of interstate commerce). Courts have
traditionally balanced the legitimate local ends served by state
regulations against the burden such activities impose on interstate
commerce. 5  In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court
summarized the law in this area:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
and imposed a four percent tax on generation of electricity which is not subject to the retail
sales tax. Id.
52. See notes 25-44 supra and accompanying text. Specifically, the framers of the
Constitution envisioned that no state would inhibit the free trade encouraged by the clause.
Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75
HARv. L. REV. 953, 956 n.8 (1962).
53. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 59-192 infra and accompanying text.
55. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). One commentator has
noted that such balancing is based on the idea that congressional will controls:
If the Court sustains the state action as not an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce, and Congress concurs, no subsequent action is required. If Congress
concludes that state action is undesirable, it retains the power to terminate its
dormant state, and assert its will pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Simi-
larly, if the Court invalidates the state regulation, Congress can consequently res-
urrect the state law by expressing its consent to such state action.
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252 (1978).
Such balancing also necessarily involves a determination of whether the measure discrimi-
nates against interstate (or out-of-state) commerce. If the measure is not discriminatory,
then its legitimacy is enhanced, for if it were not warranted, state citizens would have acted
to repeal or modify the provision. Id. at 254. But see Developments in the Law--Federal
Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, supra note 52, at 957, which notes that
since the relation of any one state's action to popular response is so attenuated, the political
accountability to state voters should be deemphasized as a guiding principle in determining
the validity of state activities with regard to interstate commerce.
56. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to legitimate
local putative benefits . . . . .f a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of
the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the na-
ture of the local interest involved, and whether it could be pro-
moted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Occasionally the Court had candidly undertaken a balancing
approach in resolving these issues . . ..
In non-constitutional contexts, the policies seeking to alleviate en-
ergy crises have been deemed to be important and thus have
prompted different treatment for energy related matters.5 8 Conse-
quently, it may be argued that such policies at the state level serve
legitimate local needs and are so important that they offset inci-
dental burdens on interstate commerce. Although the case law in
this area seems settled, troubling questions such as these remain.
II. RECENT BALKANIZATION ATTEMPTS: LOOKING TO
REALITIES?
The commerce clause is a major obstacle to state balkanization
of energy resources. Recent cases, however, highlight different
emphases in dealing with the commerce clause. Will courts look
to economic realities in defining what burdens interstate com-
merce?
57. Id. at 142 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
58. For example, several of the first cases decided by the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals (which was established pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 § 21 l(b)(1), P.L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (1970)) under the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-60h (1976), recognized that the national crisis of
energy shortages precipitated arguably different treatment of the matters before it. See,
e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (amended petroleum
price regulations which increased sales prices were permitted to be implemented without
thirty-day notice or good cause explanation as required by section 4(c) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976)); California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 340 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (an amendment to petroleum sale price regulations, which deleted an
exemption for state government proprietary sales and which was first considered by the
Cost of Living Council and delegated to the Federal Energy Office as part of the imple-
mentation of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, was permitted to go in
effect without complying to the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976)); Gulf Oil v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974)
(NEPA need not be followed in implementing regulations required by the Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act of 1973, notwithstanding the fact that there was no express statu-
tory conflict as required by case law); Mandel v. Simon, 493 F.2d 1239 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1974) (an order based on admittedly erroneous information was upheld because the
order was not "arbitrary or capricious," notwithstanding the fact that the court was statuto-
rily required to review the order pursuant to the "substantial evidence" test).
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The federal courts, at least, do consider such realities in apply-
ing the commerce clause. Recently, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady,5 9 the Supreme Court eschewed formalistic approaches
which sought to determine whether the state action directly or in-
directly burdened interstate commerce.60 Emphasizing the real ef-
fects of state actions, the Court developed a four-part standard by
which it suggested that state tax provisions be judged in light of
the commerce clause.61 Under this standard, courts should sustain
a tax under the commerce clause if it "is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-
tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to services provided by the State."'62 While this for-
mulation was predicated on the idea that "the purpose of the com-
merce clause [was not] to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burden.. ,63 it may
work in favor or against the state. Although a state may now di-
rectly tax an activity in interstate commerce, it may not tax an
activity which is not in interstate commerce if these tests are not
satisfied.
This four-part standard is now discussed in the context of re-
cent challenges to balkanization attempts in the pending cases of
Maryland v. Louisiana' and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana.
65
A. Maryland v. Louisana
In Maryland v. Louisiana,61 eight states" are seeking to invoke
59. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
60. Id. at 279-87.
61. Id. at 279.
62. Id. at 279. In Complete Auto Transit, the Court upheld a Mississippi tax on the
privilege of doing business within the state, where the tax was applied to the interstate
activity of transporting cars manufactured out-of-state from a railroad terminal in Missis-
sippi to certain Mississippi car dealers. In overruling Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951), the Court indicated that it would not apply the commerce clause to
invalidate a state's privilege tax where the four-part standard has been met. Id. at 287-89.
In the case of Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734 (1978), the Court applied the same four-part standard to uphold a Washington tax on
stevedoring against a commerce clause challenge. Id. at 750-51.
63. 430 U.S. at 288 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 308 U.S. 250,
254 (1938)).
64. Orig. Action No. 83 (U.S. S.Ct., filed March 29, 1979).
65. No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist., filed June 20, 1978).
66. Orig. Action No. 83 (U.S. S.Ct., fled March 29, 1979).
67. Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin.
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the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cQntroversies
between states68 in order to obtain a declaratory judgment that
Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas ("First Use Tax")69 vi-
olates several constitutional and statutory provisions.
The First Use Tax is a tax of seven cents per thousand cubic
feet (MCF) on any use of natural gas within Louisiana upon
which no severance or production tax has been paid or levied by
any state or territory, or upon which no import tax or tariff is as-
sessed by the United States.70 The term "use" is broadly defined
to include consumption and any processing or transportation in or
through Louisiana.7 The ostensible purpose of the First Use Tax
is to conserve various state natural resources, especially "the
state's waterbottoms, barrier reefs, and sensitive shorelands"
through which natural gas from the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) is introduced into Louisiana for distribution. 2 It has been
estimated that based on the volume of OCS gas entering Louisi-
ana in interstate commerce in 1977, the annual burden of the First
Use Tax on interstate consumers will be $225 million.73
Because Louisiana imposes a severance tax on intrastate pro-
duction of natural gas,74 the First Use Tax by its terms applies
solely to natural gas produced outside Louisiana.75 Moreover,
since Louisiana grants a severance tax credit76 from First Use Tax
accrued, Louisiana producers have a dollar-for-dollar credit of
their First Use Tax liability against their severance tax liability.7
Among other issues,78 the plaintiffs raise a potent commerce
68. Motion for Leave to File Complaint and Complaint, Maryland v. Louisiana, Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-07 (West Supp. 1980).
70. Id. § 47:1303A.
71. Id. § 47:1302(8).
72. Id. §47:1301C.
73. Maryland Complaint, Maryland v. Louisiana, Orig. Action No. 83 (U.S. S.Ct.
filed March 29, 1979), XIV, at p. 12.
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:631-46 (West 1970), which imposes a tax of seven
cents per MCF.
75. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:647 (West Supp. 1980).
77. Id.
78. Seemingly, the plaintiffs face a substantial obstacle regarding their standing to
bring this original action. In Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976), the Court de-
dined to accept an original action brought by Arizona to challenge the New Mexico statute
which was subsequently successfully challenged in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441
U.S. 141 (1979). 425 U.S. at 797-98. For a discussion of Snead, see notes 45-51 supra and
accompanying text. The Court rejected the states' arguments that they had standing by
virtue of proprietary interests or as parenspatriae for their citizens, 425 U.S. at 796, and
noted that original jurisdiction "should only be invoked sparingly," giving consideration to
300 [Vol. 30:291
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clause argument. Addressing the four-part standard of Complete
Auto Transit,79 plaintiffs first contend that the commerce clause is
violated because, as a tax on interstate commerce, the First Use
Tax is applied to "uses" 80 which lack a sufficient nexus to Louisi-
ana.8' Second, they posit that the tax is not fairly apportioned.82
Third, the plaintiffs argue that the tax discriminates against inter-
state commerce by subjecting natural gas to the threat of multiple
taxation, failing to impose an equivalent tax on gas produced in
Louisiana or transported into Louisiana from a state that imposes
a severance tax, favoring Louisiana producers of natural gas by
giving them a 100 percent credit against their Louisiana severance
tax liability, and exempting natural gas consumed for specified
purposes only within Louisiana.83 Finally, the states assert that
the tax is not fairly related to services provided by Louisiana.
They contend that the estimated $225 million in annual gross rev-
enues, which the tax would generate, far exceeds the cost of the
burdens upon, and protections afforded by, Louisiana.8 4
Louisiana defends its tax, arguing that it satisfies each of the
Complete Auto Transit criteria.8" First, it asserts that its tax is ap-
plied to activities having a substantial nexus with the taxing state
because the "uses" being taxed are all events which occur in Loui-
siana. These "uses" include "numerous activities occurring to the
gas prior to its being in a commercially accepted stage." 86 Louisi-
"the seriousness and the dignity of the claim,.. . the availability of another forum ... ,
where the issues may be raised, and where appropriate relief may be had." Id. at 796-97
(quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972)).
Notably, the Court emphasized the fact that other, private litigation pending in state
court would effectively litigate the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 797. Thus, a fac-
tual distinction could be made between Arizona v. New Mexico and Maryland v. Louisiana
since no concurrent private, state litigation has been brought. Yet, the Court in Arizona v.
New Mexico concluded with a "cautionary note" which expressed a desire by the Court to
avoid holding itself out for potential controversies involving the increasing number of dis-
putes between states. Id. at 798 (quoting Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493,
497 (1971)).
The plaintiffs also raise several constitutional arguments, which are not based on the
commerce clause. See notes 91-106 infra and accompanying text.
79. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See text accompanying note 62 supra.
80. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
81. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Maryland v. Louisiana,
[hereinafter cited as Maryland Brief] at 21.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, [hereinafter cited as Louisiana Brief] at 21-25.
86. Id. at 21.
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ana also maintains that the tax is fairly apportioned because it
does not reach any activity occurring outside of the state. 7
Louisiana further argues that the tax does not discriminate
against interstate commerce. It contends that no multiple taxation
can result since the "uses" upon which the tax is levied are all
activities occurring within the state. It is also asserted that no
commercial advantage is given to local producers of natural gas,
who are required to pay a severance tax88 at a rate equal to the
First Use Tax.89
The defendant also maintains that the tax is fairly related to
services provided, and therefore does not violate the fourth part of
the Complete Auto Transit test. It claims that forty percent of the
$800 million annual cost of shoreline and barrier island erosion is
attributable to "canals, trenches and spoil banks which serve the
marketers" of OCS. 9° It is unclear, however, whether the land be-
ing eroded is owned by the state. Even if it is Louisiana land, the
question remains whether making land available for erosion is the
kind of state service which would justify the tax.
The plaintiffs have raised three other constitutional arguments.
First, they claim that the First Use Tax violates the supremacy
clause91 since the Natural Gas Act,92 Natural Gas Policy Act of
197891 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act94 provide for a
federal scheme of regulation of interstate commerce95 and since
certificates of public convenience and necessity, issued pursuant to
these acts by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC),96 conflict with the part of the First Use Tax which pro-
vides that certain pipeline-producer contractual provisions (estab-
lished in these certificates) are void.9 7 The plaintiffs also contend
that the tax is negated by operation of the supremacy clause be-
cause the economic impact of the tax falls within the prohibition
of section 4 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which pro-
vides "[s]tate taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continen-
87. Id. at 22.
88. See note 74 supra.
89. Louisiana Brief supra note 85, at 22-23.
90. Id. at 24.
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
93. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-432 (West Supp. 1979).
94. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1976).
95. Maryland Brief, supra note 81, at 26-28.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976); see generally 61 AM. JuRis. 2D Pipelines § 6 (1972).
97. Maryland Brief, supra note 81, at 26-28.
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tal Shelf."98 Louisiana rejects these arguments on the ground that
no federal statutes create a regulatory scheme that prohibits a
state from taxing "natural gas activities" within the boundaries of
the state.99
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the tax violates the import-
export clause, which forbids states from levying duties on imports
or exports except as necessary for the execution of state inspection
laws. I°0 In seeking to avoid the obvious rebuttal argument that
Louisiana's statute avoids federal authority in this area by ex-
empting any gas upon which a duty has been levied,10 1 the plain-
tiffs contend that the First Use Tax violates the import-export
clause by preventing the federal government from dealing uni-
formly with foreign trade, and disturbs harmony among the states
by permitting Louisiana to exploit its coastal location.10 2
Third, the plaintiffs argue that the First Use Tax violates the
contracts clause 0 3 because it attempts to nullify reimbursement
provisions of existing contracts."° Fourth, they also argue that
the tax violates the equal protection clause 1 5 because, when ap-
plied in conjunction with the Severance Tax Credit, it arbitrarily
discriminates against taxpayers who engage in interstate com-
merce of natural gas produced solely in jurisdictions having no
severance tax.
10 6
Perhaps most significant to the outcome of this case is the reso-
lution of how to characterize the activities upon which the tax is
imposed. As part of its commerce clause argument Louisiana in-
cludes the following curious statement: "The tax is imposed upon
uses of natural gas after having entered the State of Louisiana all
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1976).
99. Louisiana Brief, supra note 85, at 25.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
101. Note that this rebuttal argument assumes that since only the federal government
may impose duties on imports and exports, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, the avoidance of
any conflict with this authority ipsofacto makes any state tax not a duty.
102. Maryland Brief, supra note 81, at 32-35. This argument is based on Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). In Michelin, the Court stated that the Framers of the
Constitution had three purposes for the import-export clause: to permit the federal govern-
ment to regulate commercial relations with foreign governments without disruptive state-
imposed tariffs, to prevent diversion of import revenue from the federal government to the
state governments, and to preserve harmony among the states which might otherwise be
disturbed if coastal states could levy taxes on goods destined for inland states. Id. at
285-86.
103. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
104. Maryland Brief, supra note 81, at 32-34. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
106. Maryland Brief, supra note 81, at 32-35.
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within the ambit of the First Use Tax. The tax incidence occurs in
Louisiana prior to the flow of the natural gas in interstate com-
merce."' 7 It is difficult to understand, however, how the tax can
be imposed upon uses of natural gas after it has entered Louisi-
ana, and at the same time prior to its flow in interstate commerce.
Since OCS gas is coming from outside Louisiana, the flow of the
gas in interstate commerce begins at the Outer Continental Shelf.
At best, Louisiana must contend that the flow of gas in interstate
commerce stops in Louisiana when the various taxed "uses" oc-
cur, and resumes when the gas is transported outside the state to
consumers in other states. However, since Louisiana defines
"uses" of natural gas to include sale, transportation to a process-
ing plant or measuring or storage facility, transfer of possession,
and processing,' °8 it is probable that a number of activities will be
taxed which are an integral part of the continuing flow of OCS gas
in interstate commerce.
Ultimately, it seems likely that Louisiana will not be allowed
to impose this substantial tax burden upon interstate commerce
simply by defining as local "uses" certain segments of the journey
of natural gas in interstate commerce.
Note, however, that even if the taxed activities could be con-
strued .as "local," this determination would not avoid analysis
under the Complete Auto Transit standard. Such a determination
would not be conclusive since Complete Auto Transit contemplates
an examination of the economic realities of the state's tax-the
extent of the burden on interstate commerce and the correlation
with legitimate state interests. A decision on the merits of the
plaintiffs' commerce clause challenge will probably result in a
finding of discrimination attributable at least to the danger of
multiple taxation similar to that found in Michigan- Wisconsin Pioe
Line Co. v. Calvert.109 Also, a finding is probable that the ex-
traordinary revenues being raised by the First Use Tax are not
justified by the services which Louisiana provides.
B. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,"0 various utilities
and coal companies have challenged the constitutionality of Mon-
107. Louisiana Brief, supra note 85, at 23.
108. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-1302(8) (West Supp. 1980).
109. 347 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1954). See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
110. No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist., filed June 20, 1978).
304 Vol. 30:291
1]ALKANIZ,4TION OF ENERGY MARKETS
tana's Coal Severance Tax.'1 1 As amended in 1975, the tax is
based on a percentage of the value of coal as extracted and pre-
pared for shipment from the mine. The tax varies from twenty
percent to thirty percent for surface-mined coal and from three
percent to four percent for deep-mined coal. As an additional fac-
tor, the greater the heating value (measured in British Thermal
Units or "BTU's") of coal, the higher is the percentage rate of the
tax.' 12
As the plaintiffs did in Maryland v. Louisiana,'13 the plaintiffs
here have attacked the Coal Severance Tax as inconsistent with
the tests of Complete Auto Transit."4 Focusing on the third and
fourth criteria, 15 the plaintiffs contend that the tax discriminates
against interstate commerce because-since a majority of Mon-
tana's coal is transported out of state-it deliberately places the
major portion of the tax burden on out-of-state consumers who
must pay the tax in the form of higher prices for coal and the
energy produced from that coal. 1 6 The plaintiffs also argue that
the Coal Severance Tax, considered both in isolation and in con-
junction with other Montana taxes on the coal industry and reve-
nues paid to Montana by the federal government under the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,117 is grossly disproportionate
111. MONT. REV. CoDES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to 15-35-110 (Supp. 1977).
112. Id. at § 15-35-103.
113. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
114. Plaintirs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist.) [hereinafter cited
as Opposition Memorandum], at 37-39. See 430 U.S. at 279; and text accompanying note
62 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
116. Plaintiffs further note that the traditional political check against excessive taxation
is largely inoperable here. Because the tax burden is paid mostly by out-of-state taxpayers,
Montana voters are content to watch Montana's coffers be filled by those non-residents.
Opposition Memorandum, supra note 114, at 11. As one commentator has noted:
To the extent that a state enjoys a monopolistic position with regard to raw mater-
ials,. . . it may find it advantageous to subject these activities to relatively high
taxes in order to be able to confer tax benefits on industries that it wishes to foster.
Thus a state rich in oil might levy a very high tax on oil production and a corre-
spondingly low one in manufacturing. By raising the price of goods leaving the
state, such taxes reduce the volume of trade insofar as demand is sensitive to
price; consumption shifts to theretofore more expensive goods of other producers,
and resources are correspondingly shifted from their optimum allocation. To the
extent that the out-of-state demand is inelastic, the burden of the tax will almost
surely fall on out-of-state consumers, who would seem generally to have little
influence in the state legislature.
Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business,
supra note 52, at 968-69 (1962). See note 55 supra.
117. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
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to the services and protection provided by the State. I 8 Montana
answers these challenges by arguing, first, that since the same tax
is imposed on coal consumed within Montana as well as on coal
shipped out-of-state, there is no discrimination against interstate
commerce as a matter of law.119 Second, Montana responds that
so long as the state provides some significant benefit to the tax-
payer, it is not for the courts to engage in a cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether the tax is fairly related to services provided. 12 0
Though Montana's approach on this point has the merit of
avoiding the "slippery slope" problem of how much tax is too
much, it also emasculates the fourth element of the Complete Auto
Transit test by permitting heavy tax burdens to be justified by
only marginally significant benefits conferred by the taxing state.
Implicitly recognizing this problem, Montana includes as benefits
conferred "the privileges of operating in an organized society"
and "enjoying the benefits of a valuable resource extracted from
the earth of Montana."' 21 The problem with this argument is that
Montana expended nothing to put the coal in the ground. Merely
allowing companies to mine the coal hardly seems to be a service
provided by the state, especially since a prohibition against the
mining of coal on plaintiffs property would probably be a depri-
vation of property in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. The coal, therefore, is viewed more properly as a
resource, and not a service provided by the state. 122
Similarly to the Maryland v. Louisiana plaintiffs, the plaintiffs
118. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 114, at 4-1i. Montana received $34 million
in tax revenues in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1978, and expected to receive no less than
$40 million in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1979. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Before the
Supreme Court of Montana at 9, Comonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, Case No. 14982
(Nov. 15, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Plaintffs' Montana Supreme Court Brief].
119. Defendant's Reply Brief and Brief in Opoposition to Plaintiffs Motion to [sic]
Summary Judgment, Commonwealth v. Montana, [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Reply
Brief], at 20. The same argument was attempted by the State of Ohio in Mapco, Inc. v.
Grunder, 12 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 2025 (N.D. Ohio 1979); see notes 175-92 infra and
accompanying text. In that case, Ohio imposed a Coal Use Tax which varied inversely
with the amount of sulfur in the coal. Ohio, however, produces virtually no low-sulfur
coal, and the District Court declared the tax unconstitutional in part because "[t]he practi-
cal operation of the tax is to discriminate against out-of-state coal. ... 12 ENvIR. REP.
CAS. (BNA) at 2032. See also Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 431 (1946).
120. Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 119, at 21.
121. Id. at 23.
122. Note, however, that Montana's argument may have some support in Complete
Auto Transit. There, the Court refused to rule that a tax on the privilege of doing busi-
ness-a claim similar to Montana's contention that coal users consume the coal under its
soil-was per se unconstitutional. 430 U.S. at 289.
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here contend that the tax is preempted by a number of federal
statutes which comprise a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme regarding the use and regulation of coal.' 23 Among these
statutes are the Power Plant and Industrial -Fuel Use Act of
1978,124 the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,125 the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,126 and the Federal Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920.127 Yet, Montana effectively rebuts
this argument by noting: 1) that no statute cited expressly prohib-
its state regulation or taxation of coal; 2) that these statutes have
not sought directly or exclusively to regulate coal mining; and 3)
that the 1920 Act expressly disclaims any intent to restrict the
power of the states to tax the output of mines. 28 Yet, the question
remains whether Montana's arguments accurately reflect congres-
sional desires when a state's tax is so burdensome that it substi-
tutes a new federal-economic arrangement for the one originally
devised by Congress.1 29
No doubt the most significant argument made by either party
is Montana's attempt, without reference to the Complete Auto
'Transit test, to support the severance tax under the commerce
clause, arguably independent of any Coriplete Auto Transit analy-
sis. In essence, Montana uses an approach similar to that taken by"
Louisana in Maryland v. Louisiana 1 0 -to construe the activity
upon which a tax is imposed as local, thereby avoiding any associ-
ation with interstate commerce. To this end, Montana relies on a
trilogy of cases: Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,' Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord, 2 and Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall3 1 (the
"Heisler trilogy"). These cases may be read to support the propo-
sition that the commerce clause cannot be invoked to invalidate a
state severance tax, which is simply a tax on the local activity of
extracting minerals or other natural resources from the soil.' 3 4 In
123. Plaintiffs Montana Supreme Court Brief, supra note 118, at 67-76.
124. Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15,
19, 42, 45 & 49 U.S.C.).
125. See scattered sections in 12, 15, 42 & 50 U.S.C. (1976).
126. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-642 (West Supp. 1979).
127. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
128. Brief of Defendant, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (Mont. 1st
Judicial Dist.) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's First Brief], at 8-12, 13-14.
129. See notes 152-67 infra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
131. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
132. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
133. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
134. Defendant's First Brief, supra note 128, at 3-7.
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Heisler, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Penn-
sylvania tax on anthracite coal that was mined, washed, screened,
or otherwise readied for market in Pennsylvania.1 35 Writing for
the Court, Justice McKenna stated that if the possibility or cer-
tainty of exportation of a product from a state meant that the
product would be in interstate commerce before it left the state,
then the product would be in interstate commerce "from the in-
stant of its growth or production, and in the case of coals, as they
lie in the ground."1 36 He believed such a concept was absurd be-
cause:
It would nationalize all industries, it would nationalize and
withdraw from state jurisdiction and deliver to federal com-
mercial control . . the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat
ungathered. . . and coal yet unmined because they are in va-
rying percentages destined for and surely to be exported to
States other than those of their production.' 37
A year later the Court reaffirmed this position in Oliver Iron
and upheld a Minnesota tax on the occupation of mining iron
ore. 38 Despite the fact that most of Minnesota's iron ore was des-
tined for out-of-state consumers, Justice Van Devanter, for the
Court, concluded that the ore "does not enter interstate commerce
until after the mining is done."' 39 To complete the trilogy, Hope
Natural Gas upheld a West Virginia mining tax that was chal-
lenged by a West Virginia natural gas producer which shipped
most of its production to Pennsylvania and Ohio. 14° Four years
after it had been rebuffed by the Court in its attempt to hoard
natural gas for intrastate consumers in Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia,14 1 West Virginia promulgated the mining tax through
which it could profit from, and perhaps discourage, the sale of
West Virginia natural gas in interstate commerce. In his perfunc-
tory analysis of the tax for the Court,'42 Justice McReynolds cited
Heisler, Oliver Iron, and an earlier Supreme Court case, American
Manufacturing Co. v. City of St. Louis. 43 The Court thus estab-
lished that, in protecting from commerce clause intrusion the
states' power to tax native natural resources, it would not allow
135. 260 U.S. at 253-54.
136. Id. at 259.
137. Id. at 259-60.
138. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
139. Id. at 179.
140. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
141. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
142. 274 U.S. at 640.
143. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
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commercial reality and a case-by-case evaluation of the facts to
weigh heavily in its reasoning.
In essence, Montana's position is that even if Congress could
regulate the taxation of mining activities by affirmatively exercis-
ing its power under the commerce clause-an assertion of author-
ity which would be entirely inconsistent with the rationale of the
Heisler trilogy that mining simply is not interstate commerce-the
states are free to tax mining absent such congressional regulation.
The plaintiffs, however, argue that the Heisler trilogy is no
longer applicable to commerce clause challenges to a state sever-
ance tax. They assert that since most of the coal mined in Mon-
tana is shipped out of state under long-term contracts, it is
unrealistic to view the act of mining as separate from the activity
in interstate commerce which is certain to follow." Moreover,
the plaintiffs correctly point out that the "value" upon which the
tax is assessed is more than just the value of the coal after it has
been mined. The statute defines "value" to mean the price of coal,
excluding taxes, as extracted from the mine and prepared for ship-
ment; such preparation involves crushing the coal and transport-
ing it to a nearby rail siding for subsequent shipment out-of-
state. 14 5 Thus, even if the act of mining is conceded to be only
intrastate commerce, the tax falls on activity arguably occurring
after interstate commerce has begun.
Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that numerous commerce clause
cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1937 have discarded the
Heisler rationale. 46
The trial court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' commerce
clause arguments, which were based on the Complete Auto Transit
standard. In granting Montana's motion to dismiss the complaint,
it decided that the activity subject to the Coal Severance Tax is
local and not within the scope of the commerce clause. The Court
followed the Heisler trilogy and asserted that a "mechanical test"
is to be applied to determine "whether the local -activity is an act
of commerce." It rejected the "substantial effect on commerce"
test propounded by the plaintiffs, but noted that if the latter test
were applicable, the motion to dismiss would have been denied.147
The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs' federal preemption
144. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 114, at 11.
145. Id. at 11-15.
146. See notes 167-70 infra and accompanying text.
147. Order, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Judicial
Dist., fied July 27, 1979) at 5, 17-18.
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arguments. Noting that national energy policy encourages the use
of coal as a substitute for oil, it nevertheless found that this policy
does not require the limitation or elimination of state coal sever-
ance taxes.' 48 The court found support for its conclusion in fed-
eral environmental, safety, and health measures which operate to
restrict coal production. 149 The court also dismissed the plaintiffs'
federal preemption argument based on the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 1920. It concluded that the Act's specific provision preserv-
ing the right of the states to levy and collect taxes on mine output
required such an outcome. 150
The plaintiffs have appealed the trial court's rejection of their
commerce and supremacy clause arguments. 5 ' It is true that, if
the Heisler trilogy is valid, then mining is intrastate commerce
and state regulation of it may not have to be evaluated under the
four-part standard of Complete Auto Transit. Increasing burdens
on commerce in other energy sources might also be approved
under a Heisler rationale. For example, Alaska, using a scheme
similar to Montana's, is capitalizing on its vast oil and gas reserves
by imposing a special income tax on corporations engaged in pro-
ducing crude oil or natural gas or transporting them by pipe-
line.' 52 As a result, seventy-three percent of Alaska's tax burden
falls on the oil companies, whose pipelines transport the oil and
natural gas-ninety-eight percent of which is sold or otherwise
disposed of in interstate commerce.153 Assuming Heisler may be
used to authorize taxation of the physical collection (and perhaps
production) of the oil and gas, the plaintiffs who are challenging
Alaska's scheme could raise three preemption arguments. First,
under the Natural Gas Act, 5a the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) has the authority to regulate the interstate transportation of
natural gas.155 Yet, production-defined narrowly as the "physi-
cal activities, processes and facilities of production or gather-
ing,, 1 s6-are specifically excluded from FPC jurisdiction 5 7 and
148. Id. at 19-28.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 28-31.
151. Case No. 14982 (Mont., filed Aug. 24, 1979).
152. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.21.010-.120 (Supp. 1979).
153. Complaint, Arco Pipe Line Co. v. State of Alas., Case No. 79-1903 (Sup. Ct., 3d
Judicial Dist., filed March 19, 1979) at 1116.
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717f (1976). The Act applies only to "natural gas unmixed, or
any mixture of natural and artificial gas." Id. § 717a(5).
155. Id. § 717(b).
156. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 566 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir.
1978).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
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left for state regulation. 158 However, under the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act 159 allocations of petroleum products are re-
quired to be made 6° on an equitable basis.16 1 Arguably, any tax
which places a greater burden on interstate commerce may be
viewed as inequitable and thus specifically voided by the Act.' 62
In contrast, it may be argued that Alaska's tax does not place a
relatively greater burden on interstate commerce than it does on
intrastate commerce. Lastly, under the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration Act,163 the Administrator of the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration (now part of the Energy Regulatory Administration of the
Department of Energy)" is empowered to "direct and conduct
• ..programs related to the production, conservation, use, con-
trol, distribution, rationing, and allocation of all forms of energy"
as appropriate with regard to functions delegated to him or her by
the President and Congress.165 Arguably, any state tax on gas or
oil production may interfere in such programs and as such the tax
could be invalidated. Yet, one could rebut this contention-as
Montana did successfully in another context 16 6-that these federal
statutes (and their amendments and predecessors) did not specifi-
cally prohibit taxation by states.
In any event, the validity of the Heisler trilogy as a guide in
this area must be questioned. Seemingly, the Court has aban-
doned the practice of trying to delineate what is or is not interstate
commerce. In the context of deciding the scope of congressional
commerce power, the Court has disregarded the "stream of com-
merce" analysis which determined the validity of a congressional
act if the subject of the legislation was in "the stream of com-
158. Id. For a discussion of the bifurcated scheme of state and federal regulation, see
FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631-41 (1971).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-60h (1976). This Act applies to "crude oil, residual fuel oil and
refined petroleum products." Id. § 751(b). See id. § 752(5), (6).
160. Id. § 753(a).
161. Id. § 753(b)(1)(F).
162. Id. § 755(b). This section provides:
The regulation under [the provision requiring allocations]. . . and any order is-
sued thereunder shall preempt any provision for the allocation of crude oil,
residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum product established by any State or
local government if such provision is in conflict with such regulation or any such
order.
Id.
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (1976).
164. P.O. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12009, 3 C.F.R. 142 (1978).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 764(a) (1976).
166. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
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merce." 167 The Court instead has looked more pragmatically at
congressional enactments and now examines whether the subject
involved "affects interstate commerce."' 68 Even if these cases are
distinguishable regarding the determination of whether a state act
burdens interstate commerce, the Court's opinion in Complete
Auto Transit must be viewed as a rejection of the local-interstate
dichotomy promoted by Heisler, Oliver Iron, and Hope Natural
Gas, in favor of a more realistic examination of the practical inci-
dents of a state's activity. Use of the Heisler trilogy is not only
defective because its analysis (as to what activities are local) ig-
nores the realities of exactly what goods (because of heavy out-of-
state consumption) must be considered almost inherently as inter-
state commerce, but also because (as noted previously) 69 that
even if an activity could be considered as "local," resort to Com-
plete Auto Transit is not foreclosed. A determination that an ac-
tivity is local is merely one factor to consider in applying the
Complete Auto Transit analysis and is not conclusive regarding
the validity of a state statute. Certainly under the facts of Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, for example, the fact that the
tax includes value gained by preparing coal for out-of-state ship-
ment 70 must be considered.
The question of whether state attempts to preserve or profit
from its energy resources are valid and may survive attacks based
on the commerce clause may be answered negatively, but not
without reservation. While these attempts have historically been
rejected on commerce clause grounds, the resurrection of Heisler
may provide states with a method to avoid such attacks. How-
ever, attempts by states to profit from their energy resources trav-
eling in interstate commerce, or to prevent such commerce,
logically seem to fail the Complete Auto Transit tests since these
are designed to assess accurately the burden on interstate com-
merce that any challenged state activity would impose. Ulti-
mately, Complete Auto Transit's approach of economic realism
should win out over Heisler's mechanical test.
167. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1977). For a discussion of
the "stream of commerce" theory, see Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
168. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
169. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
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III. THE OHIO COAL INDUSTRY
It seems apparent that state attempts to restrict interstate use of
energy resources for the purpose of conserving or profiting from
those resources will fail under the standard of Complete Auto
Transit. However, because of the conflict between environmental
regulations and energy needs, a similar issue has arisen concern-
ing attempts to obstruct commerce for the purpose of promoting
use of in-state resources. In Ohio, where high sulfur coal is abun-
dant,"7' utilities and other facilities burning coal have realized
that because high-sulfur coal produces large quantities of sulfur
dioxide-a hazardous pollutant-relatively expensive anti-pollu-
tion devices would have to be installed to meet sulfur dioxide
emission limitations if the Ohio coal were used.' = As a more
cost-effective alternative, coal-burning facilities decided to bum
out-of-state, low-sulfur coal and thus meet aid quality standards
without elaborate anti-pollution equipment.'73 Consequently, de-
mand for Ohio's coal declined, creating a risk of local unemploy-
ment with adverse effects on the state economy.'74 Such a turn of
events was also arguably contrary to any nationally-oriented en-
ergy policy which would desire equitable use of all available re-
sources. Both the Ohio General Assembly and the Congress of
the United States established mechanisms designed to promote
the exclusive use of in-state resources by in-state consumers. As
these mechanisms prevent consumers from receiving the benefits
of energy resources in other states, these schemes present constitu-
tional questions similar to those raised by states which seek to pre-
serve their own resources. The Ohio and congressional legislation
are discussed below.
A. Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder
Ohio coal producers, concerned about the utilities' switch to
low-sulfur coal, were able to convince the Ohio legislature to en-
act a Coal Use Tax'75 which taxed the consumption of coal "used
directly for generating steam or electric power."' 76 The rate of tax
171. 1977 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL 647; U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BU-
REAU OF MINES CIRCULAR 8312 10 (1966).
172. See, ag., Additional Factual Submission and Brief of the Cleveland Electric Illu-
minating Company before the Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 16, 1978), at 12-15.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 60,652-56 (1978).
175. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5751.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1978).
176. Id. § 5571.02(A).
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was inversely proportional to the sulfur content of the coal. Coal
with a sulfur content of less than 0.5 percent was taxed at forty
cents per ton, and coal with a sulfur content of 1.5 percent or more
was taxed at fifteen cents per ton.177 Virtually all Ohio coal
avoided, and all Kentucky and West Virginia low-sulfur coal suf-
fered, the higher rates of tax.1 78
Shortly after the first assessment under the Coal Use Tax, a
Kentucky low-sulfur coal producer, Mapco, Inc., and an Ohio
electric utility, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company,
challenged the validity of the Coal Use Tax under the commerce
clause in federal court.17 9 At the same time, other Ohio utilities
challenged the tax in administrative proceedings before the Ohio
Department of Taxation, with the outcome ultimately decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court. 8 '
On March 21, 1979, the district court enjoined the State of
Ohio from enforcing the Coal Use Tax.' The court, looking to
the practical effects of the tax, reasoned that the tax operated to
burden out-of-state coal in favor of Ohio coal:
Though the language of the Coal Use Tax does not in so many
words impose a burden on out-of-state coal to the favor of Ohio
coal, the operation of the act does. Virtually all Ohio coal en-
joys the tax rate of 15 percent per ton because Ohio coal does
not have any significant low-sulfur coal production. Though
out-of-state high-sulfur coal is subject to only the 15 cents per
ton rate, the low-sulfur coal, which is necessarily out-of-state
coal, is subjected to the higher tax rates of up to 40 cents per
ton.'
82
The court concluded that "the tax burdens and penalizes the inter-
state movement of low-sulfur coal" and that "such a discrimina-
tory tax is aprimafacie violation of the Commerce Clause."'' 8 3
In defense of its Coal Use Tax, Ohio had argued that the tax
was not repugnant to the commerce clause because it merely dis-
criminated against low-sulfur coal without regard to the geo-
graphic location of the mine that produced the coal.'8 4 The court
177. Id.
178. Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 12 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 2025, 2030 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
179. Id.
180. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
181. 12 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) at 2025.
182. Id. at 2030.
183. Id.
184. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
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quickly rejected that argument because it "blinks at the undis-
puted fact that Ohio produces no significant amount of low-sulfur
coal."'18
5
Ohio also had asserted that even if the Coal Use Tax were
found to burden interstate commerce, that burden was "inciden-
tal" and clearly outweighed by the legitimate interests of the State
of Ohio in the tax. 8 6 While agreeing that the raising of revenue
was "a legitmate state legislative function," the court nevertheless
believed that Ohio could have accomplished this objective by the
"even-handed alternative of taxing all coal at the same rate."'187
The court concluded:
As a revenue raising measure, the tax is violative of the Com-
merce Clause for failing to employ a scheme of taxation whose
impact upon intrastate and interstate commerce is even-
handed.
In addition, the act's plain intent is to preserve the jobs of
Ohio coal miners at the expense of the jobs of coal miners in
other states, an understandable purpose, but a local interest
that is inconsistent with the Commerce Clause.'
88
Soon thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court also ruled that the
Ohio Coal Use Tax was unconstitutional. 8 9 It found that the tax
was discriminatory because the "practical effects" of the tax were
to divert business away from non-Ohio producers of low-sulfur
coal.' 90 As a result, it was not a uniform or even-handed tax as
required by the commerce clause. 91
These decisions make clear the fact that state attempts to erect
barriers to interstate commerce must be invalidated, notwith-
standing their motivation. Such a result is consistent with Com-
plete Auto Transit, whose four-part standard would not have been
met by Ohio's statute.'
92
Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 12 ENVIR. REP. CAs. (BNA) 2025 (N.D. Ohio 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Cross-Motion Memorandum], at 4-5.
185. 12 ENVIR. REP. CAs. (BNA) at 2032.
186. Cross-Motion Memorandum, supra note 163, at 18 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
187. 12 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) at 2033.
188. Id. at 2034-35.
189. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
190. Id. at 474, 391 N.E.2d at 721.
191. Id. at 476, 391 N.E.2d at 722. After the Ohio Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion, Ohio voluntarily dismissed its appeal from the district court's decision.
192. Examining Ohio's tax, see notes 175-78 supra and accompanying text, under the
Complete Auto Transit standard, see text accompanying note 62 supra, the statute would
most likely be invalid. Although it could be argued that a tax on consumption of coal has a
substantial nexus to the state, it may not be so readily conceded that the tax is fairly appor-
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B. Federal Regulation-Section 125 of the Clean Air Act
Congress has recognized that meeting federal air pollution
standards causes problems such as those facing the Ohio coal in-
dustry. In August 1977, in an effort to ameliorate the situation, 93
it amended the Clean Air Act 9 4 to add section 125.195 Entitled
"Measures to prevent economic disruption or unemployment",
this section empowers the President to "prohibit any. major
fuel burning stationary source . ..from using fuels other than
locally or regionally available coal or coal derivatives to comply
with ... [air quality] .. .requirements."'' 96 In addition to the
President's prohibitory powers, section 125 gives the Administra-
tor of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
the power to dictate where a major fuel burning source may
purchase fuel.197 Before these extraordinary measures can be in-
tioned. While the tax does reach in-state consumption only, it indirectly affects interstate
(low-sulfur coal) sales by placing a larger burden on those purchasing out-of-state coal. As
both Ohio and federal courts noted, see notes 183 & 190 supra, the tax does by its practical
effect discriminate against interstate commerce. Lastly, the tax may arguably be unrelated
to the state by the fact that its tax structure imposes more liability on interstate sales and
consumption than it does on similar in-state activities.
193. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), the sponsor of section 125, indicated
during the Senate floor debate that the legislation was offered for the benefit of states like
Ohio, in which utilities were electing to come into compliance with sulfur dioxide regula-
tion by switching from in-state sources of high-sulfur coal to out-of-state sources of low-
sulfur coal. Senator Metzenbaum pointed out: "Our amendment only seeks to prevent
noncomplying utilities from needlessly disrupting the social and economic fabric of those
mining communities which have historically supplied coal to these power plants ....
123 CONG. REC. 18487 (1977).
Although appearing in Clean Air Act Amendatory legislation, section 125 was not an
environmental measure, but was aimed instead at local economic protection, according to
Senator Metzenbaum: "There is nothing in this legislation that is anything more than eco-
nomic self-preservation. It only becomes applicable, can only be used in those instances
where economic disruption or unemployment would be a reality of life." Id. at S9457.
Senator Muskie, the floor manager of the Clean Air Act amendments, opposed section
125. Regretting that it was being offered as an amendment in clean air legislation, he
viewed it as the same kind of regional trade barrier among the states that gave rise to the
need for a Constitutional Convention in 1789. Id. at S9458.
194. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979).
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7425 (West Supp. 1979).
196. Id. § 7425(b). Subsection (d) limits the application of this section to those fuel
burning stationary sources which the Administrator has determined to have a design ca-
pacity of 25,000,000 BTU's per hour, (approximately equivalent to a 73 megawatt electric
utility boiler). Id. § 7425(d). The definition of what constitutes the "local or regional area"
for purposes of section 125 is to be "as determined by the Administrator of EPA." Id.
§ 7425(h).
197. Id. § 7425(c). This subsection allows EPA to require a major fuel burning instal-
lation to "enter into long-term contracts of at least ten years in duration. . . for supplies of
regionally available coal or coal derivatives." Id.
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voked, section 125(a)(3) requires EPA to determine that these ac-
tions are:
necessary to prevent or minimize significant local or regional
economic disruption or unemployment which would otherwise
result from use by [one or more major fuel burning stationary
sources] of. . .coal or coal derivatives other than locally or
regionally available coal .. . .to comply with the require-
ments of a State implementation plan. 9 8
In short, section 125 was enacted, at least in part, to insulate
Ohio's high-sulfur coal mining industry from competition from
non-Ohio low-sulfur coal. 99 Nevertheless, it was not invoked un-
til the sulfur dioxide regulations for Ohio2 °° were upheld by the
Sixth Circuit on February 13, 1978.201 On the same day, District 6
of the United Mine Workers of America petitioned the EPA to
initiate section 125 proceedings in Ohio, ie., to begin the process
of making the necessary findings for the use of executive power
under section 125. Shortly thereafter, Governor Rhodes of Ohio,
the Ohio Mining and Reclamation Association (an association of
Ohio coal producers), and Senator Metzenbaum filed similar peti-
tions.2 o2
Much opposition was raised to these section 125 petitions." 3
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) questioned the
wisdom of any attempt by EPA to limit Ohio's electric utilities to
Ohio coal. Characterizing EPA's intended move as "balkaniza-
tion" of the steam coal market, DOE asserted that the restriction
of utility fuel sources to one state would jeopardize the ability of
the utilities "to deal with potential fuel supply disruption." The
DOE remarked that "diversity of both fuel type (i.e., generation
mix) and fuel source (i.e., market dependency) is an essential fac-
198. Id. § 7425(a).
199. See note 193 supra.
200. 40 C.F.R. § 52.1881 (1979).
201. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
439 U.S. 910 (1978).
202. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,114 (1978).
203. For example, at a public hearing held in Cleveland in August 1978, the Con-
sumer's Counsel of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio suggested that the Ohio utili-
ties preferred to meet air quality standards by switching to low sulfur coal than by
installing pollution control equipment. Transcript, EPA Public Hearing, Cleveland, Ohio
(Aug. 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA Hearing], at 125-44. This was because the Ohio
Revised Code would permit the utilities to obtain quicker recovery of the increased costs of
compliance that way than would be possible in the more complicated and time consuming
rate case that would be required to recover costs for scrubbers. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4909.191 (Page 1977). See EPA Hearing, supra, at 125-44.
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tor in emergency preparedness." 2' Similarly, ,the President's
Council on Wage and Price Stability opposed EPA's contem-
plated partitioning of coal markets along state lines because it
thought that such a measure would give undue protection to a
small sector of the economy from competitive forces, needlessly
raise electric rates and adversely affect energy-intensive industries
in the state.2°5
The Ohio utilities, and some low-sulfur coal producers from
Appalachia,2° contended that coal from West Virginia and Ken-
tucky should be deemed "locally or regionally available coal"
within the meaning of section 125.207 They questioned the wis-
dom of limiting the utilities to the coal of a federally sanctioned
but unregulated monopoly of Ohio coal producers. The Ohio util-
ities maintained that such action would increase both their costs to
their customers, and would jeopardize the reliability of their gen-
eration systems.20 8
On December 20, 1978, EPA issued a "proposed determina-
tion" under section 125(a).209 The Agency found that the pro-
posed switch by fourteen Ohio electric utility plants to out-of-state
low-sulfur coal (predominantly from Kentucky and West Vir-
ginia) as their means of compliance with emissions standards
would produce "significant economic disruption or unemploy-
ment" in the Ohio coal fields. 210 The Agency indicated that it
might be necessary to prohibit certain of these Ohio utility plants
from using non-Ohio coal and require them to install scrubbers
and enter into long-term contracts for high-sulfur Ohio coal.21'
One low-sulfur coal producer from Kentucky, McCoy Elkhom
204. Letter to F.L. Biros, EPA, from Jerry L. Pfeffer, Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Utility Systems, Dep't of Economic Regulatory Administration (Oct. 11, 1978).
205. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2067-68 (1979).
206. A group of such producers was formed under the name of the Committee to Pre-
serve the Appalachian Coal Market. Additional Factual Submission and Brief of the
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Before the Environmental Protection Agency,
October 16, 1978, at 28-49.
207. Id.
208. For example, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company estimated that the use
of scrubbers to clean Ohio's high-sulfur coal would cost it and its customers approximately
$152,000,000 more per year than if the Company used low-sulfur coal. The Company also
estimated that the use of scrubbers would lead to an estimated 20% increase in the average
residential customer's electric bill, in contrast to the estimated 6% increase that would be
incurred if the company could bum low-sulfur coal from adjoining states. Additional Fac-
tual Submission and Brief, supra note 184, at 15-18.
209. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,652-56 (1978).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Coal Corporation, instituted litigation to challenge section 125
and EPA's proceedings thereunder.21 2 The company contended
that the trade barrier created by section 125 which protected local
business from interstate competition violated the commerce clause
because "state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of
both raw material and finished goods in response to the economic
laws of supply and demand." '2 13 McCoy Elkhorn recognized that
Congress could prohibit interstate commerce under certain cir-
cumstances, but argued that in each instance where the Supreme
Court has upheld the right of Congress to do so, the prohibition
was non-discriminatory.2 14 In no prior case had Congress ex-
cluded a product from interstate commerce solely because of the
geographic origin of the product.2 15
EPA responded that the commerce clause is broad enough to
support section 125 even if the effect is to discriminate in favor of
Ohio coal producers. It also argued that the discrimination inher-
ent in section 125 was proper because it advanced national energy
goals.216
On May 7, 1979, the district court upheld the constitutionality
of section 125217 in McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EP , 2 18 noting
that Congress was granted plenary power under the commerce
clause and that any limit on that power must come from other
constitutional provisions.21 9 Since section 125 does not employ a
suspect classification subject to special scrutiny, "any discrimina-
tion engendered... is forbidden by the implicit Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Provision only if it is not rationally related
to a valid Congressional purpose."" 0 The court concluded that
212. McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EPA, 13 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1025 (E.D. Ky.
1979). The institution of this litigation prompted intervention by Kentucky and the Ohio
Edison Company on the side of McCoy Elkhorn, and Ohio and the United Mine Workers
of America, District 6 on the side of EPA. In addition, three Congressman from West
Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio (John Slack, Carl Perkins, and Thomas Ashley) appeared as
amicus curiae in opposition to EPA's actions in the Ohio section 125 proceedings.
213. Plaintifis Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Findings], at 14 (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803
(1976)).
214. Id.
215. Cf. United States v. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
216. EPA Trial Memorandum at 29-45, McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EPA, 13 ENVIR.
REP. CAs. (BNA) 1025 (E.D. Ky. 1979).
217. McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EPA, 13 ENvIm REP. CAs. (BNA) 1025, 1030 (E.D.
Ky. 1979).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1028 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1949)).
220. Id. at 1029.
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section 125 is rationally related to a valid congressional interest in
repairing the damage done to normal coal market competition by
the enactment of clean air statutes. The court acknowledged the
potential economic harm about which McCoy Elkhorn com-
plained, but concluded that its remedy was with Congress, not the
courts.2 2 '
Thus, section 125 has been upheld in the only adjudicated
challenge to its validity to date. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision.222
After that decision, EPA proposed an alternate determination
under section 125(a).223 It found that the plans of certain Ohio
utilities to switch to low-sulfur coal in order to comply with sulfur
dioxide emissions limitations would not cause such significant ec-
onomic disruption or unemployment as to necessitate further ac-
tion under subsections 125(b) and (c) of the Act.224 This
retraction of the earlier proposed determination was predicated
upon EPA's reanalysis of the actual effect of the Ohio utilities'
plans in light of EPA's action which made sulfur dioxide regula-
tions less stringent, thereby permitting greater use of Ohio coal
than EPA previously had projected.225
As a result of EPA's actions, the effectiveness of congressional
attempts at promoting exclusive in-state use of a state's resources
may remain unclear. Doctrinally, the district court in McCoy Elk-
horn Coal Corp. v. EPA seems correct. Congress certainly has the
power to prohibit interstate commerce to effectuate national pol-
icy as part of its constitutionally authorized commerce power.226
This power is no doubt premised on the belief that Congress as a
body is accountable to, and therefore acts in the best interests of,
all the states.22 7 In contrast, a state cannot block interstate com-
merce since it would not be accountable to citizens of other
states.228
However, it is uncertain whether Congress enacted section 125
221. Id. at 1029-30.
222. McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EPA, Nos. 79-3326, 79-3327, 79-3398 (decided
June 2, 1980).
223. 44 Fed. Reg. 52,030 (1979).
224. Id.
225. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1979). Recently, EPA has relaxed its enforcement policy for
sulfur dioxide in Ohio as well. 45 Fed. Reg. 9101 (1980).
226. See United States v. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
227. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism" The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection ofthe National Go vernment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
228. See note 55 supra.
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to effectuate a national energy policy, or simply to benefit the pa-
rochial interests of one state. 2 9 Although it may arguably further
a national policy of air quality improvement by forcing users to
develop better pollution control technology, 230 as an energy meas-
ure it has no national focus. The brief legislative history231 indi-
cates that the impetus of this legislation was definitely toward
local concerns.232
If Congress did not act to effectuate a national policy, the de-
sirability of section 125 is questionable. First, such an action
would contravene the purpose of the commerce clause. Section
125 attempted to accomplish what the Ohio legislature unsuccess-
fully tried.233 Congress, acting for the same reasons that a state
would, could do what a state could not, simply because it was
Congress. The justification for granting to Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce-that Congress would act in the best
interests of all the states, and not in favor of one against an-
other 234-- would be absent?235  Second, section 125 could not be
justified by the fact that it was an attempt to promote exclusive in-
state use of a state's resources-ie., it does not prevent out-of-
state consumers access to in-state resources for the purpose of con-
servation or profit; rather, it promotes in-state use of a state's re-
sources. Such a scheme produces barriers to interstate commerce.
Instead of preventing out-of-state consumers from coming into the
state, these schemes prevent consumers from getting out. Barriers
to interstate commerce for whatever purpose inhibit an open na-
tional economy, which was a potent motivation behind the com-
229. See note 193 supra.
230. See 123 CONG. REc. 18491 (1977) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
231. Section 125 was introduced on the floor of the Senate. Consequently, the debates
on this amendment are the only legislative history available.
232. See note 193 supra. Many Senators felt that this measure would result in eco-
nomic balkanization. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 18490 (1977) (remarks of Senator Baker).
The amendment passed by one vote, 45 to 44. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY RE-
PoRTS, at 1266 (June 18, 1977).
233. See notes 175-92 supra and accompanying text.
234. Wechsler, supra note 227.
235. This argument seemingly contradicts Professor Wechsler's analysis. Because of
the inherent institutional safeguards in the federal system to protect state interests, Profes-
sor Wechsler concluded "the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation
of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interests of the states, whose representatives
control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning
the challenged Act of Congress." Id. at 559. Yet, the Court; with its decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), may indicate that it is not prepared to give
Congress as great deference as would be warranted by Wechsler's theory. See also J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159-63 (1978).
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merce clause. In addition, attempts at such balkanization for
exclusive promotional purposes are not neutral. By compelling
in-state consumers to use in-state resources, out-of-state producers
are harmed.
Thus, although section 125 may be distinguished from early
attempts by states to restrict interstate use of state re-
sources-because of its federal nature and because of its motiva-
tion-such distinctions may prove meaningless in light of the
purpose of the commerce clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of conflicts over the possession and use
of critical energy resources falls into two broad categories. First,
some resource-rich states have manipulated the availability and
price of their resources to profit at the expense of other states. The
fortuitous location of coal or gas deposits can also generate inter-
nal political leverage. State and local officials have attempted to
exploit the presence of resources to achieve political goals without
increasing burdens upon their constituencies.
Another set of energy-related conflicts has been stimulated by
the attempts of states to shelter local energy producers and con-
sumers from the disadvantageous effects of national and interna-
tional environmental policies. Adversely affected parties will
naturally continue to pressure local officials for relief. For so long
as legislatures and executives remain more responsive to adversely
affected constituencies than to national environmental policies,
they probably will continue to favor locally attractive, protection-
ist schemes.
The existence of these powerful local motivations indicate the
likelihood of intensified pressures to "balkanize" energy markets
and environmental policy in the 1980's. Increasing scarcity of en-
ergy supplies will augment the political and economic power
which accompanies the control of resources. State and local offi-
cials will be induced to exercise taxing and regulatory authority to
further their own advantage rather than the most propitious use of
resources.
However, the force of the commerce clause may deter, if not
invalidate, many of these activities-the policy of promoting a
unified, national economy directly contradicts the spirit of these
attempts. Only if states are allowed to escape the legitimate reach
of the commerce clause by resort to formalistic, outdated analysis,
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will serious disruptions of the national economy occur. However,
such analysis appears to have been discarded by the Supreme
Court in Complete Auto Transit. Scrutiny of state schemes under
this pragmatic rationale seems more compatible with the goal of
enhancing the national economy. In addition, use of this realistic
framework would ignore ostensible motivations and look only to
the impact on interstate commerce.
A more difficult problem of legal analysis and national policy
is posed by the involvement of the federal government in such
locally protective schemes. When localized interests utilize the
national forum to accomplish their narrow purposes, the constitu-
tional restraints on such action are not as clear as in the case of
action by the individual states. Careful attention must be paid by
both legislators and jurists to the underlying purposes of the com-
merce clause as it may relate to the activities of the federal govern-
ment when those activities restrict the free flow of interstate
commerce as envisioned by the authors of the commerce clause.
It should be clear that if attempted balkanization is a poor policy
for individual states to pursue, it is no less pernicious when at-
tempted by the same interests acting through the federal govern-
ment itself.
